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Abstract
While potentially more productive, more complex tasks request more e¤ort, generating larger
agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping
generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents,
however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks
to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for
larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually
increase, especially when agents are patient and turnover limited, so that compensation deferral is
very useful to mitigate moral hazard.
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1 Introduction
Agency problems arise when principals cannot precisely observe and control what agents do (Holm-
strom, 1979; Grossman and Hart 1983; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). To provide incentives to limited
liability agents, principals must promise large compensation in case of success. This gives rise to
agency rents.2
As shown in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), agency rents increase with the cost of e¤ort, or, equiva-
lently, the private benet from shirking. The (opportunity) cost of e¤ort varies with the characteristics
of the task delegated to the agent. An important characteristic of a task is its complexity. Brünner-
meier and Oehmke (2009) note that a complex problem can be decomposed in sequence of simple,
elementary ones. To successfully complete the complex task, the agent must solve each of the sub-
problems. Hence, the larger the complexity of the tasks and the number of subproblems, the larger the
agents e¤ort, and the more severe the moral hazard problem. They analyse variation in the number
of tasks a manager has to carry out. Dessein and Santos (2006) emphasize the exibility enjoyed
by managers with broad job denitions. While Dessein and Santos (2006) do not consider agency
problems, this suggests that complex jobs, with many tasks and large exibity, leaving signicant
discretion to the agent, are exposed to more severe moral hazard. Combining these observations with
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), complex tasks raises more severe moral hazard problem, and generate
larger agency rent.
We study the dynamics of complexity and rents in an equilibrium model in which successive
generations of agents acquire increasingly sophisticated skills corresponding to increasingly complex
tasks, generating increasing rents.
Model and results: To clarify the origin of rents in our analysis, we assume there is no scarcity
of managers. Thus, if the market for managers was frictionless, principals would hire only those
managers that are optimal from their point of view, maximizing returns net of rents. Since agents
2 Instead of unobservable ex-ante e¤ort, Thomas and Worall (1988), Kocherlakota (1998), Townsend (1979), Diamond
(1984), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), emphasize ex-post unobservability and limited commitment: A problem arises
when the agent cannot commit not to leave the rm, while it would be di¢ cult to complete the task successfully if the
agent absconded. In this context, the principal must leave the agent a rent, to convince him not to abscond. Our key
insights also obtain in that alternative, but for our purpose essentially equivalent, framework.
2
would choose to acquire only those skills that make them employable, complexity would not rise above
what is optimal for principals. In contrast, we assume there are search frictions in the labour market.
We consider an overlapping generations model, in which agents live two periods. At the beginning
of his life, a generation t young manager chooses (at a cost) a given skill, corresponding to a given
type of task, denoted by b. b can be interpreted as the number of layers of complexity of the task.
More complex tasks potentially generate larger gross returns, but their completion also demands larger
e¤orts, and therefore entails larger costs.
Once agents have acquired their skill, each young principal meets a young agent, observes his b,
and decides whether to hire him or not.3 When making this choice, the principal bears in mind that
she could instead i) search for another generation t agent or ii) hire a generation t 1 agent, and then
another agent at time t+ 1. We assume principals incur a (possibly very small) cost when searching
for managers. This shuts down competition between contemporaneous managers, as in Diamond
(1971), enabling one to focus on the key driving force in our model: competition between successive
generations.
It is particularly attractive for a generation t principal to try and hire a generation t   1 agent
if low bs were chosen by that generation. Thus, when generation t   1 acquired skills corresponding
to simple tasks, this limits the ability of generation t to increase its own b to earn high rents. The
competitive pressure imposed by the previous generation is limited, however, by the endogenously im-
perfect substitutability among generations. The intuition is the following: To reduce rents, principals
defer compensation (as in Becker and Stigler, 1974, and Rogerson, 1985). This makes it relatively
unattractive for a young principal to hire an old agent. Indeed, old agents have short horizons, which
prevents deferring their compensation to reduce their rents. Thus, other things equal, it is cheaper to
incentivize young agents than old ones. Because old agents are imperfect substitutes for young ones,
the latter can a¤ord to choose technologies with greater agency problems than their predecessors, and
still be hired. This gives rise to an upward trend in complexity and agency rents, which is the core
result of our paper, stated in Proposition 1, below. Note that, even when higher complexity raises
gross returns, the increase in rents eventually reduces net returns for principals.
3 In our main analysis, we focus on the case in which the principal can make a take-it or leave-it o¤er to the agent.
We then relax this assumption, analysing the case in which the agent has some, but not all the, bargaining power. Our
key results still hold in that extension.
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Empirical implications: The main novel empirical implication of our theoretical analysis is that
increasing complexity should be associated with increasing agency rents. This should be particularly
pronounced for industries in which agents have greater opportunities to opt for complex techniques,
and in which such complexity is more likely to create agency problems.
One industry for which this is particularly relevant is nance, where the lack of hardwired techno-
logical constraints raises the scope for rent-seeking driven complex innovations.4 Accordingly, Philip-
pon and Reshe¤ (2008) observe a simultaneous increase in managersrents and investment techniques
complexity, while Célerier and Vallée (2014) document an increase in complexity for structured prod-
ucts, and Greenwood and Sharfstein (2012) observe an increasing share of institutions relying on
complex investment techniques. Also in line with our model, Böhhm, Metzger and Strömberg (2018)
observe rising rents in the nance sector without an increase in talent and suggest this points to moral
hazard rents.
In order to confront our model to a broader cross-section of industries, we use S&P Capital IQ
Professional Data, which document job functions and compensation for professionals. We focus on
US rms between 2010 and 2016, a period during which the capital IQ dataset is well documented.
We rely on two proxies for complexity: the number of functions of an executive and the number of
occurrences of the term complexityin a companys 10-K form. For both proxies, we nd that, during
our sample period, average compensation grew signicantly more in industries with larger increase
in complexity.5 We also nd, in line with our model, that rents grew more in industries with lower
turnover.6
Our model delivers additional testable predictions: The increase in rents and complexity spurred
by an initial deregulation or technology shock should not be instantaneous. Rather it should be
sustained and delayed. Consequently sustained increases in rents and complexity can still take place
when there is no current change in exogenous variables.
Yet another implication of our analysis relates the increase in rents to the search for yields. In
4Another industry in which increasingly complex techniques may have led to increasing rents is the healthcare industry
(see e.g. Bodenheimer, 2005).
5We do not claim causality. Our empirical results should be seen as descriptive and illustrative.
6Turnover acts in our model as a restriction on long-term contracts, which mitigates the ability of agents to extract
more rents than previous generations.
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general, the rise of complexity and rents is limited by the constraint that agents must leave enough
return to the principals to convince them to delegate the management of their wealth rather than
self-invest it. When the return on self-investment is low, which can be proxied by low safe return and
low return on indexing, this should increase agentsability of agents to increase complexity and rents.
Finally, our analysis implies that experienced managers and junior managers are imperfect sub-
stitutes. This should show up in hiring and compensation data. For example, when new slots open
up, experienced managers are imperfect substitutes for junior ones. Our theory also predicts that
imperfect substitutability, and its consequences, should be stronger when incentive problems are more
severe and compensation more backloaded.
Literature: Our analysis of agents rentseeking is in line with Baumol (1990) and Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1991). Both in their analysis and ours, rentseeking agents impose costs upon
the others. In Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), however, these costs are
exogenously directly induced by the actions of the rentseeker, e.g., warfare, litigation or predatory
trading. In contrast, in our analysis, the initial choice of the agent (complexity) has an indirect
endogenous impact on the principal, via the agency rent it induces, and also on subsequent increases
in complexity.7
Our work is also related to Axelson and Bond (2015)s equilibrium analysis of dynamic contracting
with overlapping generations and moral hazard. In Axelson and Bond (2015) agents can be assigned
to two types of task, with di¤erent levels of moral hazard and productivity. Thus, a common theme in
their paper and ours is the selection of tasks, and corresponding moral hazard, arising in equilibrium.
The endogenous rise in rents over time, reecting imperfect competition between successive generation,
is one of the key specic results of our model, di¤erentiating it from Axelson and Bond (2015).
Our point that agents in the nance industry choose complex products and techniques to increase
the rents they extract from principals, echoes the point made by Carlin (2009) that competing nancial
institutions design complex products to increase their market power. A major di¤erence is that our
analysis hinges on agency problems, which can arise even with large rational investors, while Carlin
(2009) focuses on retail investors and abstracts from agency issues.
7 In Rajan and Zingales (1998), agentsex-ante investment in human capital increases their rents ex-post. While in
Rajan and Zingales (1998) this can be e¢ cient, in our analysis there is ine¢ ciently large investment in technology.
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Our analysis is also related to Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2013). In their paper also, op-
portunistic occupational decisions lead to rents and ine¢ ciencies and give rise to externalities. The
economic mechanisms at work in the two papers are di¤erent, however. In Bolton et al (2013), that
many agents choose to become dealers in the OTC market worsens adverse selection in the other
market. In contrast, in our analysis, that agents choose complex techniques worsens moral hazard,
and increases rents, for the following generations.
Last, our paper is related to the literature on social norms, which explores, notably, how parents
transmit values or preferences to their children (see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000). In our model,
in contrast with that literature, the transmission of norms from one generation to the next is driven
by competition between generations. And we show that the imperfection of that competitive process
induces a decline in standards.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 presents the optimal contract designed by one
principal, hiring one agent for two periods. Section 4 embeds this bilateral contracting problem in an
equilibrium labour market context and analyzes the dynamics of rents. Section 5 discusses robustness
and extensions. Section 6 presents our empirical analysis. Section 7 briey concludes. Proofs not
given in the text are in the appendix.
2 Model
Investors and managers: Each period, a massone continuum of investors and a massM
continuum of managers are born. M  1, so that there is no scarcity of managers. In this overlapping
generations model, successive generations of managers coexist in the market at a given point in time,
which creates the scope for competition between generations.8
All market participants are risk neutral, have limited liability and live for two periods. The discount
factor of investors is  2 (0; 1), while that of managers is  2 (0; 1). In line with the literature on
dynamic nancial contracting (e.g., DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and
8While successive generations of agents are key to our analysis, our qualitative results would be unchanged if we
considered innitely lived principals.
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Rochet (2007)), we assume   .
Each investor is initially endowed with one unit of investment good. She can invest it in a default
technology, which she can operate herself and which returns 1 unit of consumption good per period
during two periods. Alternatively, she can delegate the management of her capital to an agent,
hereafter referred to as the manager. For simplicity the choice between selfinvestment and delegated
investment is irreversible.
Managers have zero initial endowment. At the beginning of his life, each young manager must
choose among a range of techniques indexed by b 2 [0; 1]. Each technique corresponds to a specic
type of skills, knowhow and human capital. The (nonmonetary) cost of acquiring skills b is equal to
cb, with c  0. Importantly, the choice of b is irreversible. The idea is that managers acquire skills,
human capital, relations and technical knowledge at an early stage in their career. Then, they use
this informational capital.9
Complex tasks: When entrusted with one unit of capital, manager b can generate return equal
to R(b)  1 units of consumption good per period during each of the two periods of his life. We
assume R is continuous, increasing and concave in b.10 R0(b) denotes the left derivative of R(b). Since
R is concave, R0 is decreasing and, in the same spirit as Inada conditions, we assume that R0(1) = 0.
b measures the complexity of the task delegated to the agent. As noted by Brünnermeier and
Oehmke (2009, page 6): One way to deal with complexity is by dividing up a larger, complex task
into smaller, more manageable subtasks.b can be thought of as the number of subtasks. The greater
the number of subtasks to be completed, the greater the cost of e¤ort for the agent.
As Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we assume e¤ort is unobservable and the agent has limited
liability, which raises a moral hazard problem. At the beginning of each period, the agent can exert
e¤ort or shirk. When the agent exerts e¤ort, i.e., checks each of the b layers of complexity, the project
generates cash ow R(b) for sure, while, when the agent fails to exert e¤ort, cash ows can be R(b)
with probability 1 , or 0 with probability .
In line with Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), instead of framing the model in terms of cost of e¤ort,
9See Oyer (2008) for empirical evidence on long term e¤ects of initial career paths in the nancial sector.
10The assumption that R is increasing is not needed for our analysis. Our qualitative results are upheld when R is
constant. Moreover, one can interpret R(b) as the e¢ cient frontier of the production set, in b/output plane.
7
we, equivalently, assume private benets from shirking, i.e., opportunity cost of e¤ort.11 In line with
the above discussion, we assume this opportunity cost of e¤ort is increasing in b, the complexity of
the task. More precisely, we assume the private benet is equal to bR(b), i.e., fraction b 2 [0; 1] of
the loss in expected output due to shirking (R(b)). Increasing complexity makes checking all the
aspects of the project more demanding, which raises the opportunity cost of e¤ort.12
Sequence of play: for an investor and a manager born at t  1, the timing of actions is the
following:
At time t:
 Stage 1: Young manager i in generation t chooses bit 2 [0; 1).
 Stage 2: Each young investor is matched with one young manager, observes his bit, and decides
whether to make him a takeitorleaveit contract o¤er or reject him. For simplicity, we
assume the principal has all the bargaining power. In Subsection 5.2.1 we show that our results
are robust to giving the agent some (but not all) bargaining power. Since there is a mass one
of investors, and a mass M  1 of managers, each manager is matched with an investor with
probability 1=M . This probability is the same for all managers. In particular, it cannot depend
on the choices made by managers at stage 1, because an investor can check a managers b only
after being matched with him.
 Stage 3: If the investor decides to reject the young manager with whom she was matched, or
if the manager rejects the o¤er, then the investor decides whether to selfinvest or search for
another manager, at cost , which can be arbitrarily small. If the investor decides to continue
searching for managers, she can direct her search towards young or old managers. Then, on
meeting a new manager, the investor observes his b and can make him a takeitorleaveit
o¤er, and the process is iterated. Eventually, investment takes place.
 Stage 4: Each employed manager decides whether to exert e¤ort or not, then output is realized
(and equals R(bit) or 0), and the manager receives the compensation stated in the contract.
11The di¤erence is that, while the cost of e¤ort is incurred on the equilibrium path, the private benets from shirking
are not. This leads to slightly simpler expressions.
12Sato (2015) o¤ers a more precise microfounded analysis of the e¤ect of complexity and opacity on agency problems.
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At time t+ 1:
 If the investor born at time t hired a manager born at time t, they apply contract signed at time
t. If the time t output was 0 and the contract stated the manager should be red in that case,
the investor can search for a new agent, at cost .
 If the investor born at time t hired a manager born at time t   1, she can search for a new
manager at t = 1.
 If the investor did not hire a manager at time t, she invested her endowment of investment good
in the default technology, and therefore no longer has any choice to make at t+ 1.
3 Optimal contracting
In this section, we analyse the optimal contract designed by one principal, hiring one agent, taking bt
as given. In the next section we embed this contracting problem in a market equilibrium and study the
endogenous determination of bt. The compensation contract o¤ered at time t by the investor states
the wages to be received by the manager as a function of the output realized at time t and at time
t+ 1. It also species if the manager should be kept after period t or red.
First consider the contract requesting the agent to exert e¤ort at both times. In that case, on the
equilibrium path, the output is equal to R(bt) at each period. It is clearly optimal to re the manager,
without any compensation, when output is 0. Hence, the time t contract is pinned down by the pair
of wages, wtt and w
t
t+1, paid to the manager if output R(bt) is generated in period t and in period
t + 1. After success at time t, the incentive compatibility condition at time t + 1 is that the gain of
the agent when exerting e¤ort (wage wt+1) be larger than or equal to his gain when shirking (wage
with probability 1  plus private benet from shirking)
wtt+1  (1 )wtt+1 +btR(bt);
that is
wtt+1  btR(bt): (1)
9
At the end of period t, after R(bt) has been obtained, the continuation utility of the agent, anticipating
e¤ort at t+ 1, is wt+1. Thus, at time t the incentive compatibility condition is
wt + w
t
t+1  (1 )(wtt + wtt+1) + btR(bt):
That is
wtt + w
t
t+1  btR(bt): (2)
In this section we set the exogenous outside option of the manager to 0, so that his participation
constraint never binds. In the next section, the endogenous outside option of the manager will still be
0. The program of the investor is to maximize expected net returns subject to incentive compatility
constraints, i.e.,
max
wtt ;w
t
t+1
R(bt)(1 + )  wtt   wtt+1; s.t., (1) and (2). (3)
The solution to this program is spelled out in the next lemma.
Lemma 1: At time t, for a given choice of bt, if  > , the solution to (3) is such that (1) and
(2) bind, the wages conditional on success are
fwtt; wtt+1g = f(1  )btR(bt); btR(bt)g: (4)
If  = , only (2) binds, but the wages in (4) are still (weakly) optimal. In the optimal contract
inducing e¤ort the net gains of the investor are
Z(bt)  R(bt)[(1 + )  (1 +   )bt]; (5)
while the present value of the managers earnings is
wtt + w
t
t+1 = btR(bt): (6)
Complexity, net returns and rents. By Lemma 1, the present value of the fund managers
earnings is btR(bt). Thus, the agent captures a fraction (bt) of the gross return on the investment over
one period (R(bt)). Since the agents outside reservation utility is 0, btR(bt) is his rent. Although the
principal has all the bargaining power at the contracting stage, incentive compatibility and limited
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liability imply the agent earns a rent. In that sense, the agency problem (parametrized by b) gives
the agent some endogenous bargaining power.
As the complexity of the task (bt) increases, the total gross return increases, because R0  0. In
addition, the fraction of that return captured by the agent also increases, because the agency problem
worsens. Combining these two e¤ects, the compensation of the agent increases with the complexity of
the task.
While agents benet from an increase in complexity, principals can be made better o¤ or worse o¤
when complexity rises. Indeed,
Z 0(bt) = [(1 + )  (1 +   )bt]R0(bt)  (1 +   )R(bt):
Because (1 + ) > (1 +    )bt and R0(b) is decreasing, the investorsnet return is concave in the
complexity of the task. And because R0(1) = 0, we have Z 0(1)  0. Thus, starting from Z(0),
investorsnet return initially increases with b, reecting the increase in gross return R(b). Then, it
reaches a maximum point at
b = argmax
b
Z(bt): (7)
Finally, for b > b, investorsnet return goes down with b, reecting that an increasing fraction of the
return is captured by the agent. To make things interesting, we assume Z 0(0)  c, i.e., at the lowest
level of complexity the enhancement in net return brought about by an increase in b exceeds the cost
c. Finally denote by bmax the highest value of b in [0; 1] such that Z(b)  1 + , i.e., investors prefer
delegated investment rather than self-investment.
Optimality of e¤ort: For the contract in Lemma 1 to be the optimal contract, it must generate
higher net gains for the principal than the alternative contracts requesting i) no e¤ort at all, or ii)
e¤ort at time t and no e¤ort at time t + 1, or iii) no e¤ort at time t and e¤ort at time t + 1. By
Lemma 1, the net gains of the investor requesting e¤ort at both periods are as given in (5). On the
other hand, if the principal lets the agent shirk at both periods, he does not need to pay any wage,
and his net gains are
R(bt)(1 + )(1 ): (8)
11
(5) is greater than (8) i¤

1 + 
1 +     bt: (9)
Since bt 2 [0; 1], this always holds i¤ is large enough, in the sense that
  1 +   
1 + 
: (10)
One can show that under (10) shirking once is also dominated by e¤ort at both periods. Hence, the
contract spelled out in Lemma 1 is the optimal contract if (10) holds, which, for simplicity, we assume
hereafter. If we did not make that assumption, there would be a threshold value of b at which the
principal would prefer to give up on e¤ort. In equilibrium, agents would not set b above that threshold,
whose role would be similar to that of bmax. Apart from that, relaxing (10) would not alter our results.
Example: A simple example is when R(b) is the piecewise linear function min[b+1; R], where
 and R > 1 are positive constants. For this simple case, if the agency problem is not too severe, in
the sense that
1 + 
1 +    
2 R  1

; (11)
then the level of complexity maximising Z(b) is also that maximising output net of cost,
b =
R  1

: (12)
4 Equilibrium dynamics
We now turn to the dynamics of complexity. We focus on symmetric equilibria, in which all managers
born at time t choose the same equilibrium level of complexity, bt .
For simplicity, we assume the ex-ante expected gain of an agent, bR(b)M   bc, is increasing in b, i.e.,
R(b) + bR0(b)
M
 c: (13)
This implies that, for any b, the ex-ante expected gain of an agent is non negative, and also that any
b < b would be Pareto dominated: both managers and investors would be better o¤ with a larger b.
So, we initialize the process at b0 = b.
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From that point on, any increase in complexity reduces the net returns of investors, while raising
the rents of managers. Thus, there is a conict of interest between the former and the latter. We now
study whether market forces lead to an equilibrium that is more favorable for the investors (keeping
complexity at b) or for the managers (letting complexity rise above b).
Given an initial level of complexity, b0, an equilibrium is a sequence E = fbt ; wt

t ; w
t
t+1gt1, satis-
fying the following conditions:
 Optimization: At each time t, each young manager i chooses bit to maximize his gains, and
each investor makes an optimal hiring decision.
 Rational expectations: Investors and managers have rational expectations about the equilib-
rium dynamics E and nd it optimal to also play according to E . Thus, on the equilibrium path
at time t, young manager i nds it optimal to set bit = b

t , and each investor o¤ers the optimal
contract
fwtt ; wtt+1g = f(1  )btR(bt ); btR(bt )g: (14)
In each generation, at stage 2, each manager is drawn with probability 1M . This probability does
not vary with managers bs, because we assume that, before contacting the manager, the investor
cannot observe the managers type. Once drawn, a manager strictly prefers to be hired and earn (6).
Thus, at stage 1, manager i chooses bit to maximize his expected gains
1
M
R(bit)b
i
t   cbit; (15)
subject to the constraint that the investor prefers hiring hime when drawing him. To analyse that
constraint, we need to compare the investors payo¤ when hiring the young manager to her payo¤
from alternative actions:
 The rst alternative option for the investor is selfinvestment. She does not choose that option
if her net return on delegated investment, Z(bit), is larger than
1 + : (16)
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 The second alternative option for the investor is to hire an old agent in period t and then hire
a generation t manager at t+ 1. At time t she would have to compensate the old agent enough
to avoid shirking. This would entail promising the old agent compensation at least as large as
bt 1R(bt 1). Such compensation would attract the old manager irrespective of whether he is
employed or not. Similarly, at time t+1 the investor would have to pay the new recruit btR(bt ).
Hence, overall, if she were to opt for that deviation, the time t investor would expect to get
R(bt 1)(1  bt 1) + R(bt )(1  bt )  (1 + ); (17)
where the last term ((1 + )) is the search cost of going after an old manager at t and then
another one at t+ 1.
 The third alternative option for the investor is to hire an old manager at t and then a young
one at t+ 1. In this case, when deviating, the generation t investor expects to pay bt 1R(bt 1)
to the old manager she hires at time t, and bt+1R(bt+1) to the young manager she hires at time
t+ 1. Consequently, the deviating investor expects to earn
R(bt 1)(1  bt 1) + R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)  (1 + ): (18)
 The fourth alternative option for the investor is to search for another young manager at time t,
expecting to hire him for two periods and to compensate him with fwtt ; wtt+1g given in (14). In
this case the investor expects to earn
Z(bt )  : (19)
Overall, the employability constraint for the young manager is that Z(bit) be larger than or equal
to (16), (17), (18), and (19).
Bearing in mind that bmax is the highest b such that investors prefer delegated investment rather
than self-investment, the young manager is employable as long as he picks b in the subset of [b; bmax]
such that
Z(b)  max[R(bt 1)(1  bt 1) + max[R(bt )(1  bt ); R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)]  (1 + ); Z(bt )  ]:
Since the expected gain of the young manager is increasing in b as long as he remains employable, his
optimal choice is as stated in the next lemma.
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Lemma 2: The maximisation program of the young agent at time t has a unique solution bt
which is either equal to bmax or such that
Z(bt) = max[R(b

t 1)(1  bt 1) + max[R(bt )(1  bt ); R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)]  (1 + ); Z(bt )  ]: (20)
Equation (20) implicitly denes the function  giving the optimal choice of bt as a function of
bt 1, bt and bt+1, i.e., bt = (bt 1; bt ; bt+1). In equilibrium, the young investor must nd it optimal to
choose a level of complexity equal to bt . Therefore, either bt = bmax or
bt = (b

t 1; b

t ; b

t+1): (21)
It can never be the case that Z(bt ) = Z(bt )   , even when  is arbitrarily small, as long as it
is strictly positive. Thus the cost of searching for managers, even if it is very small, shuts down
competition within the same generation.13 Consequently, evaluated at bt = bt , (20) simplies to
Z(bt ) = R(b

t 1)(1  bt 1) + max[R(bt )(1  bt ); R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)]  (1 + ): (22)
R(b)(1   b) is the net return to an investor hiring a manager, with skill b, for one period. For
b  b, this net return is decreasing with b, reecting that the manager extracts an increasing fraction
of the surplus.14 Thus, when it is expected that complexity will increase from t to t + 1, the max in
(22) is R(bt )(1  bt ). In that case, either bt = bmax (in which case bt  bt 1), or (22) simplies to
R(bt )(1  bt ) R(bt 1)(1  bt 1) =  btR(bt )  (1 + ): (23)
Since, the righthandside of (23) is negative, we have that R(bt )(1  bt )  R(bt 1)(1  bt 1), that is
bt  bt 1. Thus, between t  1 and t, there is an increase in complexity, worsening agency problems,
and eroding investorsreturns while raising managersrents. This is stated in the next lemma.
13As discussed below, this is similar to Diamond (1971), but, in contrast with Diamond (1971), in our model, managers
from generation t also compete with their predecessors and successors.
14To see this note that Z0(b), which for b  b is negative, is equal to the derivative of R(b)(1   b) plus a positive
term.
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Lemma 3: If bt+1  bt , then bt  bt 1.
To interpret the increase stated in Lemma 3, consider the righthandside of (23). (1+), the cost
incurred by investors searching for another manager, obviously limits competition between managers,
in particular managers belonging to the same generation (as in Diamond, 1971). To focus on the
specic economic mechanism at play in our model, which is driven by competition between managers
from di¤erent generations, consider the limit case where  goes to 0. In that case, the increase in b is
solely driven by btR(bt ). This is the di¤erence between the net investors revenue when the principal
hires agent bt on a long term basis (Z(bt )) and when she hires the agent via a sequence of short
term contracts ((1 + )R(bt )(1   bt )). This is a measure of the advantage of long term contracting,
which is feasible with young agents, but not with old ones. Thus, it is a measure of the extent to
which old managers are only imperfect substitutes for young ones. (23) shows how young managers
take advantage of this imperfect substitutability: They raise complexity (and thus rents) above the
prior level, up to the point at which investors are indi¤erent between i) hiring young managers on a
longterm basis to complete a more complex task, and ii) hiring old managers on a shortterm basis
to complete a less complex task.
While Lemma 3 spells out what happens at time t when b is expected to rise after t, the next
lemma states that future bs cannot decrease in equilibrium.
Lemma 4: bt never decreases.
The intuition for Lemma 4 is the following. By Lemma 3, if b was to decrease at t, it would have
to decrease at t+1. In fact, as shown in the appendix, b would have to go down by increasingly large
lumps and eventually go below 0, which is a contradiction. Combining Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, we obtain
our rst proposition:
Proposition 1: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. In that equilibrium, investors
hire managers from their own generation for two periods. Equilibrium complexity and agentsrents
increase until bt reaches bmax. Starting from b0 = b, as long as bt < bmax, bt is the unique solution
of the recursive equation (23), which implicitly denes the function  mapping bt 1 into bt .
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Proposition 1 directly implies the next corollary, which gives a lower bound on the increase in bt
due to imperfect competition among generations.
Corollary 1: As long as bt < bmax, the growth of bt is faster than exponential, i.e.,starting from
b0 = b
,
bt 
b
(1  )t : (24)
The greater the patience of the agent (), the greater the advantage of longterm contracts over
short termcontracts, the lower the substitutability among generations, the higher above bt 1 gener-
ation t can raise bt . Hence the larger the lower bound on the growth of bt .
Relation with Diamond (1971) and role of . If  was strictly equal to 0, the equilibrium
condition would be
Z(bt ) = max[1 + ;R(b

t 1)(1  bt 1) + max[R(bt )(1  bt ); R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)]; Z(bt )]: (25)
The process bt presented in Proposition 1 solves (25), and thus remains an equilibrium when  = 0.
There are, however, other equilibria, in which the equilibrium value of b is between b (dened in (7))
and bt (characterized in Proposition 1). In those equilibria, it is the last term (rather than the middle
one) that binds in the max on the righthandside of (25). That is, the choice of b by a generation t
manager is constrained by the choices of his competitors from the same generation (not by those of
his predecessors).
When  = 0 and (25) holds, it is weakly optimal for investors not to resample after drawing a
manager. If they follow that strategy, the equilibrium remains as in Proposition 1. It is, however,
also weakly optimal for an investor to sample all the 1  M managers that are not employed, after
drawing a manager with bt . If a manager anticipated such behaviour, then his bestresponse would
be to opt for bit slightly lower than b

t , to make sure he would eventually be drawn and hired. Since
all managers would reason similarly, this would drive the equilibrium choice of b down to b. In this
type of equilibrium, competition between managers would lead to the outcome preferred by investors.
This argument, however, and the possibility for b to be an equilibrium, dont apply when  is
strictly positive, in which case the unique equilibrium is that characterized in Proposition 1. Thus
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, arbitrarily close to, but strictly above, 0, limits competition between managers belonging to the
same generation. This is comparable to the way search costs limit competition and generate rents
in Diamond (1971). One contribution of our analysis, relative to Diamond (1971), is to study the
equilibrium dynamics of rents, and show they have a tendency to increase along the equilibrium path.
To see this more clearly, note that the model in Diamond (1971) is similar to a oneperiod version of
our model, where the equilibrium condition on the level of b prevailing at time 1 would be
Z(b1) = max[1 + ; Z(b

1)  ]: (26)
(26) immediately leads to b1 = bmax. This contrasts with our model where bt progressively increases
over several periods, before eventually reaching bmax. The reason why the increase in bt is only
progressive in our model is that the choice of generation t is constrained by the choices of previous
generations. That anchor does not exist in Diamond (1971). Yet, in our model, the moderating e¤ect
of the previous generation is limited, due to imperfect substitutability between generations. Hence
the gradual increase in bt .
Externalities. When choosing bt 1, generation t  1 sets a benchmark, with which generation t
will have to compete when choosing bt . Thus, while the actions of generation t  1 have no exogenous
direct e¤ect on the following generation, they exert an endogenous externality on the latter. When
choosing a relatively high level of complexity bt 1, generation t  1 does not internalize that this will
lead to an even larger level of complexity bt , and thus large rents for generation t managers and low
net returns for generation t investors.
Compensation and seniority. Lemma 1 implies that wtt < w
t
t+1. Thus, for a given genera-
tion, compensation rises with seniority, i.e., a given agent earns more when senior than when junior.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, however, imply that senior managers from the previous generations
earn less than junior managers from the current generation. Indeed, from Lemma 1, wt 1t  wtt i¤
bt 1R(b

t 1)  (1  )btR(bt ): (27)
Since bt  bt 1, (24) implies (27). The increase in rents (driven by the increase in complexity) from
one generation to the next is larger than the increase in compensation, within one generation, from
one period to the next.
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Example: In our simple example, in which R(b) = min[b+1; R], the following corollary obtains:
Corollary 2: If R(b) = min[b+ 1; R] and (11) holds then, as  goes to 0, bt goes to
min[
b
(1  )t ; bmax]: (28)
In general, the increase in bt above b, made possible by the imperfect substitutability between
old and young managers, is enhanced by the fact that R(b) increases in b. In the simple example,
however, R(b) is constant when b is above b. In that situation, the increase in bt is solely due to the
imperfect substitutability between old and young managers. Correspondingly, the growth in bt is just
equal to its lower bound, stated in Corollary 1.
Welfare. As discussed above, the optimal level of complexity for investors is b, which maximizes
Z(b) (see (7)), while (by (13)) it is bmax  b for managers. Now turn to what a benevolent social
planner would decide. For simplicity, we herafter set  = . Since utilities are linear, there is a unique
Pareto optimum regarding real decisions, and the points on the Pareto frontier di¤er only in terms of
purely redistributive transfers between investors and managers. In the rst best, the social planner
solves the following problem:
max
b2[0;1]
W (b) = (1 + )R(b) Mcb:
The optimum is such that the marginal benet of e¤ort equals its marginal cost, i.e.,
b = R0 1(
Mc
1 + 
):
Since R
0
(1) = 0, we have b  1. Now,
W (b) = Z(b) + (bR(b) Mcb):
Hence
@W (b)
@b
jb=b = (R(b) Mc) + bR0(b);
which, by (13), is positive. Consequently, b  b. We summarize this discussion is the next propo-
sition:
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Proposition 2: The level of complexity preferred by investors is lower than the socially optimal
level of complexity, which, in turn, is lower than the level of complexity preferred by the managers,
i.e.,
b  b  bmax:
The fraction of total surplus obtained by investors is decreasing in b. Therefore they prefer b to
be lower than the social optimum. In contrast, the fraction of total surplus obtained by managers is
increasing in b, and therefore they want it to be higher than the social optimum.
Delayed adjustment to changes in the environment. Suppose complexity increased, ac-
cording to the law of motion given in Proposition 1, and reached its maximum level: bmax. For
simplicity, we hereafter focus on the simple case in which R(b) increases linearly with slope  until R
and then becomes at for all b  b = R 1 . This implies bmax = (1 + )(1  1R).
Now assume that, due to a technological breakthrough or change in regulation, for projects initiated
from time t on, R is raised to
R
! , with ! 2 (0; 1).15 This leads to an increase in the maximum possible
level of complexity to
(1 + )(1  !R ):
How does this a¤ect complexity and rents?
The next proposition states that the positive shock generates a progressive increase in complexity
and rents, which persists until all the additional protability has been absorbed by agency rents.
Proposition 3: Suppose that, at time s < t, equilibrium complexity reached bmax = (1+)(1 
1
R
) and then remained constant. If, at time t, there is a one-o¤ permanent technological change,
raising R up to
R
! , then, if 
R  1, complexity starts rising again until it reaches its new maximum
(1 + )(1  !R).
At t   1, the constraint that the principal be better o¤ hiring an agent than self investing was
binding. The time t technological shock relaxes this constraint. Yet, complexity does not jump
immediately to the new level at which the constraint binds. Rather, the positive technological shock
15Our analysis is valid irrespective of whether this change was anticipated or not.
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implies that now its the employability constraint that binds complexity choices. Thus bt is anchored
by bt 1, and progressively rises, as in Proposition 1, until it reaches its new maximum. Our theory thus
predicts that increases in rents and complexity will occur long after (and not just after) technology or
deregulation shocks.
5 Robustness and extensions
In this section we discuss extensions of the model and compare it to an alternative specication.
For simplicity we hereafter focus on the case, introduced above as an example, in which R(b) is the
piecewise linear function min[b+ 1; R], where  and R > 1 are positive constants.
5.1 Agentsbargaining power
In the analysis above we assumed the principal had all the bargaining power. This implied that an
agents rent, when hired at time t, was set by the binding incentive compatibility constraint, and
therefore just equal to bt R. How would relaxing this assumption a¤ect equilibrium dynamics?
First, consider the case in which agents have all the bargaining power. Then, when a principal
contacts an agent, the latter demands all the surplus, leaving the former with the reservation utility
from selfinvestment, 1 + . If the principal was to reject such a demand, then she would have to
draw another agent, at cost . Since this new agent would also have all the bargaining power, he
would also o¤er the principal 1 +  only. Hence, rejecting the initial o¤er and drawing another agent
would give the principal at most 1 +    . Thus, when agents have all the bargaining power and
there are (possibly innitesimal) search costs, principals only obtain 1 + , while agents extract any
additional value creation (in line with the Diamond paradox). In this context, rents immediately
jump to their maximum level: In contrast with the benchmark case in which principals have all the
bargaining power, there is no progressive increase in rents. Moreover, while in the benchmark case,
agents strategically opt for complexity in order to obtain rents, in the alternative case in which agents
have all the bargaining power, agents choose complexity to maximise productive e¢ ciency.
Second, consider the case in which agents have some of the bargaining power, but not all. More
precisely, assume that, each time a principal and an agent meet, with probability  < 1 the agent can
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make a take it or leave it o¤er and, with probability 1   , the principal can make a take it or leave
it o¤er (in our benchmark case in the previous section,  = 0.)
When meeting at time t a young agent i with complexity bit, if the principal has the bargaining
power, she can o¤er her bit R, since, if the young agent refused, he would get 0 (as he would be rejected
and never drawn again.) In contrast, at the initial meeting time, if the young agent has all the
bargaining power, she demands rent wt , leaving the principal with
R(1 + )  wt :
If the principal rejects that o¤er, one thing she can do is to draw another young agent, hoping to have
the bargaining power with that one. If she does have the bargaining power she gets
R(1 + )  btR:
If she does not, the agent o¤ers her wt , and if she accepts, she gets:
R(1 + )  wt ;
where wt is the equilibrium wage the principal expects to pay if he draws another agent. Hence, to
be acceptable, the initial o¤er of the young agent must be such that
R(1 + )  wt  ( R(1 + )  wt ) + (1  )( R(1 + )  bt R)  ;
where the left-hand side is what the principal gets if she accepts the young agents o¤er, and the
right-hand side is a lower bound on what the principal expects to get if she rejects the initial agent
and draws another one from the pool.
In equilibrium, wt = w

t . Thus the acceptability constraint yields
bt R+

1    w

t :
Since, at the same time, incentive compatibility requires
wt  bt R;
we have
bt R+

1    w

t  bt R:
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Thus, as long as  remains bounded away from 1 (i.e., agents dont have all the bargaining power),
when  goes to 0, the agency rent goes to bt R. Because the principal can draw another agent at
innitesimal cost , even if the agent has some bargaining power, she obtains just bt R, exactly as
when the principal has all the bargaining power. Hence, the results obtained in the previous sections,
corresponding to  = 0, still hold when 1 >  > 0: There is a progressive increase in rents, driven by
the equilibrium increase in complexity.
5.2 Experience and productivity
In our benchmark model, young agents are more attractive than old ones, because they have longer
horizon. This e¤ect could be undermined if experience increased productivity, which would increase
the attractivity of older agents relative to younger ones. To examine this point we now assume that,
when exerting e¤ort, a young agent generates R(b), while an old one generates R(b) with  > 1.
While experience increases productivity, ageing in itself does not. This rules out an equilibrium in
which only old agents would be employed, since these agents would not be experienced and therefore
would not be productive. Thus, in equilibrium young agents are employed for two periods, as in the
benchmark case.
In this context, rst take b  b as given and consider a principal dealing with an agent over
two periods. It is easy to show that the optimal contract is to pay the agent only when output R is
obtained, and set wages equal to
wt = bmax[1  ; 0] R;
in the rst period, and
wt+1 = b R;
in the second period. Thus, when old agents are really more productive than young ones, as  > 1 ,
the agent is paid only at the second period, and, at the rst period, the present value of his rent is
b R. In contrast, when   1 , the agent is paid at both periods and, at the rst period, the present
value of his rent is (1  )b R+ b R = b R, as in our benchmark model.
First consider the case in which the productivity advantage of experience is moderate, i.e., 1 <  
1
 . Following the same logic as in our benchmark model, the employability condition for the generation
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t agent choosing his bt is (as  goes to 0)
R(1 + )  bt R  R(   bt 1) +  Rmax[   bt ; 1  bt+1]:
The lefthand side is the present value of the gains of the principal hiring for two periods the young
agent he drew from the pool. The righthand side is the present value of the gains of the principal
rejecting the young agent and then hiring two consecutive agents. The rst term on the right-hand side
is the net gain of the principal at the rst period, during which she hires an old agent from generation
t  1. The second term on the righthand side is the present value of the gains of the principal at the
second period. The max operator reects that the principal will optimize between hiring an old agent
(from generation t) and a young agent (from generation t = 1).
Binding the employability condition, and imposing the equilibrium condition that bt = bt , we have
R(1 + )  bt R = R(   bt 1) +  Rmax[   bt ; 1  bt+1]:
Simplifying, this yields
bt   bt 1 =
(   1 + )bt 1   (   1)
1   +

1   min[0; (   1) + b

t+1   bt ]:
If
bt 1 >
   1
   1 +  ;
then the right-hand side is strictly positive, and therefore bt > bt 1. Thus we can state our next
proposition:
Proposition 5: If   1 and
b >
   1
   1 +  ;
then equilibrium complexity increases until it reaches bmax.
So when the productivity advantage of experienced agent is moderate, the equilibrium outcome is
qualitatively similar to what obtained in the benchmark model. Now, turn to the alternative case, in
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which  > 1 . In that case, the present value of the rent of a young agent b hired for two periods is
b R. Thus, the employability condition is
R(1 + )  bt R  R(   bt 1) +  Rmax[   bt ; 1  bt+1]:
In equilibrium this must hold for bt = bt . This yields the equilibrium condition
R(1 + )  bt  R  R(   bt 1) +  Rmax[   bt ; 1  bt+1]:
Simplifying
bt 1  (   1) + max[0; (bt   bt+1)  (   1)]:
Since bt cancels out, except in the max on the right-hand side, the employability constraint does not
impose a cap on bt . Hence, the only constraint on that choice is that the principal prefer delegated
management rather than self investment. Correspondingly, bt moves directly to bmax.
Thus, the equilibrium prevailing when  is large is qualitatively di¤erent from the benchmark case.
Because experienced agent are much more productive than rookies, there is no competition between
generations, and the maximum value of complexity and rents is reached immediately.
5.3 Turnover
Now suppose that, at the end of period t, with probability 1   , an agent born at the beginning of
t is hit by an exogenous shock forcing him/her to leave the market. The principal who initially hired
this agents must, at period t + 1 hire a new agent. To do so the principal draws from the pool of
unemployed old agents, o¤ering wage btR(bt ). For the agents born at t and who have ot been hit by
a shock, the incentive compatibility condition at t+ 1 is still (1). In contrast, at time t, the incentive
compatibility condition is no longer (2), but
wtt + w
t
t+1  btR(bt): (29)
As before, the two incentive conditions bind and the wage prole of the agent born at time t is
fwtt; wtt+1g = f(1  )btR(bt); btR(bt)g; (30)
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while the net return to the principal is
R(bt)[(1 + )  (1 +   )bt]: (31)
Thus, everything is as in the benchmark model, except that the discount factor  is now multiplied
by the probability to be around at the next period, . Thus, as  goes to 0, bt goes to
min[
b
(1  )t ; bmax]; (32)
and, noting that the turnover rate is 1  , we can state the next corollary:
Corollary 3: When an agent can be hit by an exogenous shock forcing him/her to leave the
market, the equilibrium growth rate of rents is decreasing in the probability of this shock, which, in
equilibrium, is the turnover rate.
5.4 An alternative model with technological progress but without moral hazard
The analysis in the previous sections shows that moral hazard combined with endogenous choice of
complexity leads to an increase in rents and complexity. Could the same patterns obtain, without
moral hazard, just because of technological progress? To examine that issue, consider an alternative
model di¤ering from ours in three ways:
First, there is technological progress. To capture this as simply as possible, assume R(b) =
min[bt + 1; Rt] where Rt increases with time.
Second, there is no moral hazard.
Third, to ensure that the agent can earn rents (in spite of the absence of moral hazard), assume
wages are pinned down by Nash bargaining: The fraction of gross prot (R(bt)) transferred as wage
to the agent is equal to the bargaining power of the agent, which we denote by .
In this context, the principal and the agent agree on the optimal level of complexity: that which
maximises output net of costs. Since  > c, the optimum is obtained at bt =
Rt 1
 . To compare the
equilibrium outcomes in that alternative model and in ours, it is useful to focus on the following four
variables:
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 Complexity: In both models, complexity increases with time: bt is b

(1 )t in our model and
Rt 1
 in the alternative model.
 Wages: In both models, agents total wage increases with time: btR(bt ) in our model and R(bt )
in the alternative model.
 Wages as a fraction of gross output: In our model, agents total wage as a fraction of gross output
is bt , which increases with time, while in the alternative model it is equal to , a constant.
 Deferral: In our model, to mitigate moral hazard agents pay must be partly deferred, so that
wtt < w
t
t+1, in spite of the fact that the agent is more impatient than the principal. In the
alternative model, because the agent is more impatient than the principal, wages are front
loaded, so that wtt > w
t
t+1.
6 Empirical analysis
Our model delivers two types of implications about the relation between managerscompensation on
the one hand, and complexity and turnover on the other hand:
First, at a bilateral contracting level our model predicts that individuals whose jobs are more
complex, and hence more prone to moral hazard, should have higher compensation, reecting agency
rents (see Lemma 1).
Second, at an equilibrium level our model predicts that industries in which complexity grew more
should also be industries in which compensation grew more (see Proposition 1). Our model also
predicts that this increase in compensation should be muted in industries in which turnover is large
(see Corollary 3).
A formal econometric test of our model is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the goal of this
section is to present empirical patterns in compensation, complexity and turnover and compare them
to the above described implications from theory.
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6.1 Data
S&P Capital IQ Professional Data: Our main data source is S&P Capital IQ Professional Data
(accessed through WRDS), which gathers proles of professionals with their company a¢ liations.
Available data includes individual identiers, standardized job functions, titles and compensation.
Using information on the start date and end date of the a¢ liation on an individual with a given
company, we build a panel where each observation is an (individual, rm, year) triplet. We restrict
the data set to employees of publicly-traded rms that were included at least once, between 2010 and
2016, in the S&P Composite 1500 Index.16 We focus on the recent period 2010-2016 because Capital
IQ is substantially weaker before 2010.
In our sample, in a given year, a rm employs on average 20 professionals included in the Capital
IQ dataset.17 We dene a yearly measure of turnover at the rm level by computing for each (rm,
year) the number of relationships ending during the year divided by the total number of observable
employees.
Proxies for complexity: Our rst proxy for the complexity of an individuals job is the number of
functions of that individual in Capital IQ. The larger the number of functions of the agent, the larger
the number of layers of complexity, in the same spirit as in Brünnermeier and Oehmke (2009). Also
the larger the number of functions, the larger the exibility and discretion enjoyed by the manager, in
the same spirit as in Dessein and Santos (2006). Thus, the larger the number of functions, the more
severe the moral hazard.
Our second proxy for complexity is computed at the rm-level, by counting the number of occur-
rences of the string "complex" in a rms 10-K report: When rm complexity is higher, we expect the
word complexity to be reported more frequently. And we expect managers operating in complex
rms to have complex tasks, raising the scope for moral hazard. To construct this second proxy for
complexity, we access and parse company lings information from the U.S. Securities and Exchange
16This index combines three indices, the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600 to cover
approximately 90% of the U.S. market capitalization.
17Thus the number of employees that we can attach to a company at a given point in time is substantially higher
than in EXECUCOMP. This is one of the reasons why we use these data. The second one is that Capital IQ reports the
Number of Functions of each employee, which, as discussed next, we use to proxy for complexity.
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Commission (SEC) available online in the SEC EDGAR system. For each company in our sample, we
collect the 10-K ling in 2010 and in 2016, when available, and calculate the number of occurrence of
the string complexin the document.
Our two proxies of complexity are quite di¤erent: The rst one varies with individuals, so that it
o¤ers some variation within rms. The industry-level correlation of the two proxies is .12, showing
that, while positively correlated, the two variables are capturing di¤erent dimensions of complexity.
Variables used in the empirical analysis: In the appendix, we provide a detailed denition of the
all variables used in the empirical analysis. The median total annual compensation of the professionals
in our sample is USD 765,113, with a standard deviation of USD 1,403,558. The median number of
functions is 3, with a standard deviation of 2.13. The median number of occurrences of the term
complexity in a rms 10-K is 3, with a standard deviation of 6.37. The median yearly turnover
rate is 10%, with a standard deviation of 4%.
We compute variables at the SIC 3 industry level by aggregating information of rms-workers in
each industry, and averaging across rms in the industry. Thus we compute average total compensation
growth, average variation in the number of functions of workers and average change in the number of
occurrence of complexin the 10-K lings, between 2010 and 2016, as well as average yearly turnover.
Furthermore, to be used as control variables, we calculate the average market value of rms in a
given industry, as well as corresponding average market value growth between 2010 and 2016, using
Compustat consolidated company-level market value (common shares outstanding multiplied by the
month-end price that corresponds to the period end date).
6.2 Regressions
Individual-level regressions: In line with Lemma 1, we regress the log of an individuals average
annual compensation over the years spent at a given rm on our two complexity variables. For the
rst proxy of complexity (NbFunction), which varies within rms, we can add rm xed e¤ects, which
allows for an identication based on within rms variations in job complexity. In line with the model,
and for both proxies, there is a signicantly positive link between complexity and the level of total
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compensation.18 To give a sense of the economic magnitude, a one standard deviation change in the
second measure of complexity (NbComplex10K) is associated with a 13% increase in the level of total
compensation.
Industry-level regressions: In a second set of regressions, reported in Table 2, we compare ag-
gregate behaviours across industries. To do so, we average variables at the industry level (SIC3).
When computing averages, we restrict ourselves to individuals working in the same SIC3 industry in
2010 and 2016. Last, we only consider industries with more than one rm, which leaves us with a
cross-section of 180 SIC3 industries.
As stated above in Corollary 3, our model predicts compensation growth to be smaller in industries
in which turnover is higher. As can be seen in Column 1 of the table, the cross-industries correlation
between compensation growth and turnover is signicantly negative. Again, we are not claiming
causality, we are just observing that the correlation between endogenous variables observed in the
data has the same sign as that predicted by the model. To give a sense of magnitudes, a one standard
deviation increase in the level of turnover is associated with compensation growth that is lower by
8 percentage points. The result is robust to adding additional controls (see Column 2), namely the
average market value of rms in the industry in 2010 (AvgMktV alue) and the average market value
growth between 2010 and 2016 (AvgMktV alueGrowth).
As stated in Proposition 1, in equilibrium compensation increases simultaneously with complex-
ity. Thus, empirically, across industries, large compensation growth should be associated with larger
increase in complexity. This is the case in our data, both when complexity is proxied by the number
of functions of an agent (Colums 3 and 4), and when it is proxied by the number of occurrences of the
word complex (see Columns 5 to 8). To illustrate the economic magnitude of the e¤ect, a one standard
deviation higher increase in complexity (in the cross-section of industries) is on average associated with
a compensation that is higher by 12 percentage points.
18As mentioned above, we think of this regression as an illustration of empirical patterns rather than a formal econo-
metric test. In particular, we dont interpret the observed correlations in terms of causality.
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7 Conclusion
We study how overlapping generations of agents acquire skills corresponding to more or less complex
tasks. Complexity increases gross returns, as well as the cost of e¤ort, which, in turn, increases agency
rents. Because of the link between incentives and horizons, young and old generations are not perfect
substitutes. Thus, young agents can choose more complex technologies, and correspondingly larger
rents, than their elder peers. Competition, however, precludes large deviations from the choices of
older generations. This leads to a progressive increase in complexity and rents. This key insight is
robust to several changes in the modeling of the game between principals and agents, such as (1) giving
more power to the principal (e.g. commit to simple technologies, access monitoring technologies, better
search technologies) and (2) giving more bargaining power to the agent.
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Proofs:
Proof of Lemma 1: The Lagrangian is
L = R(1 + )  wtt   wtt+1 + t(wtt + wtt+1   btR) + t+1(wtt+1   btR);
where t and t+1 are the multipliers of the time t and t+1 incentive constraints, respectively. The rst
order condition with respect to wt is:  1+t = 0. Hence the incentive compatibility constraint at time
t binds, i.e., wtt+w
t
t+1 = btR. The rst order condition with respect to wt+1 is:  +t+t+1 = 0.
Substituting t = 1, t+1 =    . When  > , t+1 > 0, so that the the incentive compatibility
constraint at time t+ 1 also binds. Hence, the optimal compensation is as stated in the lemma.
QED
Proof that, under (10), shirking once is dominated by e¤ort at both periods: E¤ort
at both periods dominates shirking at t, followed by e¤ort at t+ 1, if
R(bt)[(1 + )  (1 +   )bt]  R(bt)[(1 ) + (1  bt)]:
That is

1    bt: (33)
E¤ort at both periods dominates e¤ort at t, followed by shirking at t+ 1, if
R(bt)[(1 + )  (1 +   )bt]  R(bt)[(1  bt) + (1 )]:
That is

    bt: (34)
Now
1 + 
1 +    <
1
1   

   ;
Hence if (9) holds (which it does under (10)), then (33) and (34) also hold, so that e¤ort at both
periods is optimal.
QED
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R and Z in the simple example: If R(b) = min[b+ 1; R],
Z(b) = (b+ 1)[(1 + )  (1 +   )b];8b 
R  1

and Z(b) = R[(1 + )  (1 +   )b];8b >
R  1

:
Thus
Z
0
(b) = [(1 + )  2(1 +   )b]  (1 +   );8b 
R  1

and Z
0
(b) =  (1 +   ) R;8b >
R  1

:
Thus, Z 0  0 for b  R 1 . For b 
R 1
 , Z
0  0 if and only if
(1 + )  (1 +   )
2(1 +   )  b:
This holds for all b  R 1 , if
(1 + )  (1 +   )
2(1 +   ) 
R  1:
That is
1 + 
(1 +   ) 
2 R  1

;
i.e., (11) holds. Hence, (11) implies b = R 1 .
Proof of Lemma 2: 
 is non-empty because b 2 
. Indeed
Z(b)  max[R(bt 1)(1  bt 1) + max[R(b)(1  b); R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)]  (1 + ); Z(bt )  ];
since R(b)(1  b) is decreasing in b for b  b. 
 is compact. This compact subset of the real line has
a unique maximum, bt, which denes the unique solution of the maximisation program of the agent.
If bt 6= bmax, it must be that bt < bmax. If (20) did not hold, this would imply that the lefthand
side of (20) would be strictly above its right-hand side. This strict inequality would by continuity
extend to a neighbourhood of bt included in [0; bmax], which would contradict the fact that bt is the
maximum of 
. So, either bt = bmax, or bt solves (20).
QED
Proof of Lemma 4: By Lemma 3, if b is to decrease between t   1 and t, i.e., bt < bt 1, we
must have bt+1 < bt . Then, as long as b  bmax, (22) is
R(bt )(1 + )(1  bt ) + btR(bt ) = R(bt 1)(1  bt 1) + R(bt+1)(1  bt+1)  (1 + ): (35)
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Denote g(bt) = R(bt)(1  bt). In terms of g, (35) writes as
g(bt )(1 + ) + b

tR(b

t ) = g(b

t 1) + g(b

t+1)  (1 + ):
That is
g(bt ) =
g(bt 1) + g(bt+1)
1 + 
  b

tR(b

t )
1 + 
  (1 + ): (36)
Since
g(bt 1) + g(bt+1)
1 + 
  b

tR(b

t )
1 + 
  (1 + ) < g(b

t 1) + g(bt+1)
1 + 
;
we have
g(bt ) <
g(bt 1) + g(bt+1)
1 + 
:
By Jensen inequality (as g is concave and decreasing), this implies
bt >
bt 1 + bt+1
1 + 
;
that is
bt   bt+1 >
1

(bt 1   bt ):
Because 1 > 1, This implies that, as t goes to innity, b

t   bt+1 goes to plus innity, which, since
bt  bmax, implies bt+1 goes to minus innity, a contradiction since b  0.
QED
Proof of Corollary 1: (23) rewrites as
R(bt )
R(bt 1)
= (
1  bt 1
1  (1  )bt
)  (1 + )
[1  (1  )bt ]R(bt 1)
: (37)
Proposition 1 implies that the lefthand side of (37) is larger than one. Hence (37) implies
(
1  bt 1
1  (1  )bt
)  (1 + )
[1  (1  )bt ]R(bt 1)
 1;
which, in turn yields (24).
QED
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Proof of Corollary 2: In the simple example, for b  b, (23) simplies to
bt =
bt 1
1   +
(1 + )
(1  ) R:
Thus, as  goes to 0, we get (28).
QED
Proof of Lemma 5: W (b) decreases with b, 8b > b. 8b  b, W (b) increases with b if
(1 + ) Mc. This is implied by our assumption that R(b) Mc, if
(1 + )  R(b) = R:
Now, since  = , condition (11) simplies to
(1 + )  2 R  1:
Hence, W (b) increases with b if
R  1;
which holds. Hence, W (b) increases with b, and b = b.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3: At time t  1, we had
bt 1 = (1 + )(1 
1
R
);
since the equilibrium choices of agents and principals were pinned down by the constraint that b 
(1+)(1  1R), and the employability constraint involved only variables set at time t  1 or t  2. The
time t change in technology, however, a¤ects the time t employability constraint, which becomes
R
!
[1 +    bt ] = max[
R
!
(1  (1 + )(1  1R )) + 
R
!
(1  bt ); 1 + ]: (38)
The lefthand side is the present value of the principals gains if she hires the bt agent. The righthand
side is the maximum of what the principal could get if i) hiring an old agent (with b = (1+)(1  1R))
at time t, and then another old agent (with b = bt ) at t+ 1, or ii) self investing.
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At time t   1, the constraint that the principal be as well o¤ hiring the agent as self investing
was binding. The change in technology opens up the possibility that at time t this constraint becomes
slack. In that case, (38) yields
bt =
1 + 
1   (1 
1
R
) > bt 1;
i.e., complexity starts growing again. This does not violate the constraint that the principal be better
o¤ hiring the agent than self investing if
R
!
[1 +    1 + 
1   (1 
1
R
)]  1 + ; (39)
where the left-hand side is the present value of the gains of the principal hiring the bt agent, while the
right-hand side is the present value of self investment. (39) simplies to
R[1  1
1   (1 
1
R
)]  !:
This holds for ! small enough i¤
 R  1:
QED
Proof of Proposition 4: Once an agent has been selected (from the pair the principal was
initially matched with), all is as in the benchmark model. The employability condition is still
b  bt 1 + Min[bt ; bt+1] + (1 + )

R
: (40)
Prior to that stage, however, the agent also takes into account that her choice of b a¤ects the
probability to be chosen against his competitor. Rationally expecting the actions of the principals
and the other agents, the agent expects to be hired with probability
2
M
Pr(b  bt + jit ) =
2
M
(1  F (b  bt )):
So his expected rent is :
8<: 2M (1  F (b  bt ))bR if b  bt 1 + Min[bt ; bt+1] + (1 + ) R0 otherwise
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Denote by bc(bt ) the value of b at which (1 F (b bt ))b reaches its maximum. bc(bt ) is the solution
of the implicit equation b = 1 F (b b

t )
f(b bt ) (uniquely dened by the monotone hazard rate assumption).
Without the employability constraint, if the agent anticipated his competitors to opt for bt , he
would choose bc(bt ). As long as bt < bc(bt ), the employability constraint binds, and the agent cant
choose bc(bt ). Rather he goes for bt , just as in the benchmark case of Proposition 1.
Now suppose that i) at time t, bt < bc(bt ) holds, but ii) the subsequent complexity arising in
the benchmark case, bt+1, would be such that bt+1 > bc(bt+1). Then, unlike in the benchmark case,
equilibrium complexity goes to the xed point of bc
1  F (0)
f(0)
=
1
2f(0)
:
Combining the two cases, the unique symmetric equilibrium complexity, bt , is dened recursively
by:
8<: bt =
bt 1
1  +
1+
1 

R if
bt 1
1  +
1+
1 

R < min[bmax;max[b
; 12f(0) ]]
min[bmax;max[b
; 12f(0) ]] otherwise
QED
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Denition of the variables used in the empirical analysis
Variables used in individual regressions:
 AvgTotalCompensationi;f : Average Total Annual Cash Compensation between 2010 and 2016
of individual i while working at rm f .
 NbFunctioni;f : Number of function of individual i at rm f in 2010.
 NbComplex10Kf : Number of occurrence of the string complex in the 10-K ling in 2010 of
the company f employing the individual.
Variables used in industry regressions:
 AvgTotalCompensationGrowthj : Growth of the average compensation in industry j, i.e., (Av-
erage Total Annual Cash Compensation in 2016)/(Average Total Annual Cash Compensation
in 2010), using all individuals working at a rm in industry j in 2010 and/or 2016.
 NbFunctionj : Variation in the average number of function of individuals in industry j between
2010 and 2016, i.e., (Average number of function in 2016)-(Average number of function in 2010).
 NbComplex10Kj : Variation, between 2010 and 2016, in the average number of occurrence of
the string complex in the 10-K lings of companies belonging to industry j, i.e., (Average
number of occurrence in 2016)-(Average number of occurrence in 2010).
 Turnoverj : Average yearly turnover of rms in industry j between 2010 and 2016, where the
yearly turnover is dened as the ratio between the number of workers leaving the rm in the
year and the total number of workers this year.
 AvgMktV aluej : Average market value of rms in industry j in 2010.
 AvgMktV alueGrowthj : Growth of the average market value of rms in industry j between 2010
and 2016, i.e., (Average Market Value in 2016)/(Average Market Value in 2010) - 1.
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log(AvgTotalCompensation)
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 13.56*** 13.84*** 13.49***
(0.02) (0.32) (0.02)
NbFunction 0.01* 0.02*** -
(0.005) (0.004)
NbComplex10K - - 0.01**
(0.004)
Firm F.E. - Yes -
R2 0.0003 0.43 0.002
Nb. Obs. 9,724 9,724 15,425
Table 1: Regression of the log of the average compensation (AvgTotalCompensation) on the number
of functions (NbFunction) and the number of occurrence of complexin the employers 10-K lings
(NbComplex10K), between 2010 and 2016, at the individual level. ***, ** and * correspond to
rejection of the null that the coe¢ cient is zero, respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the rm level for the regression in Column (3).
Observations lying above (below) the quantile 99% (1%) of the dependant or independent variable
distribution are removed.
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AvgTotalCompensationGrowth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 1.41*** 1.43*** 1.23*** 1.25*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.37*** 1.38***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10)
Turnover -1.89** -1.91** - - - - -1.57* -1.59*
(0.85) (0.82) (0.89) (0.89)
NbFunction - - 0.27*** 0.26*** - - 0.24*** 0.23***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
NbComplex10K - - - - 0.03** 0.03** 0.02* 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
R2 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.13
Nb. Obs. 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Table 2: Regression of the growth in the average compensation (AvgTotalCompensationGrowth) on
average yearly turnover (Turnover), variation in the average number of functions (NbFunction)
and change in the number of occurrence of the string complex in companies 10-K lings
(NbComplex10K), between 2010 and 2016, at the industry level. Controls include the average
market value of rms in the industry in 2010 (AvgMktV alue) and the average market value growth
between 2010 and 2016 (AvgMktV alueGrowth). Variable denitions are provided above. ***, ** and
* correspond to rejection of the null that the coe¢ cient is zero, respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations corresponding to industries contain-
ing only one rm or lying above (below) the quantile 99% (1%) of the dependant variable distribution
are removed.
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